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I compare Read’s model of kinship terminologies to a sociological model of a
romantic and sexual network. This comparison leads to an account of
how models function to construe explanations that complement Read’s own
account.
1.
Read argues that modeling cultural idea systems serves to make explicit
the cultural rules through which “cultural idea systems” frame behaviors
that are culturally meaningful. Because cultural rules are typically “invisi-
ble” to us, one of the anthropologists’ tasks is to elicit these rules, make
them explicit and then use them to build explanations for patterns in cul-
tural phenomena. The main example of Read’s approach to cultural idea
systems is the formal modeling of kinship terminologies. I reconstruct
Read’s modeling strategy as comprising the following steps:
[R1] From the way in which culture-bearers compute kin relations
a data model is construed that makes explicit the cultural theory
embedded in a kinship terminology.
[R2] A theory model is obtained through operations performed on
the data model and from a theory for kinship terminology struc-
tures.
[R3] If the theory model is isomorphic to the data model, the the-
ory is explanatory for that kinship terminology.
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In Read’s account, the last step is crucial for explanation: isomorphism be-
tween the theory model and the data model is held to license the conclu-
sion that the theory explains the kinship terminology of interest. Philoso-
phers of science have been debating whether isomorphism is necessary for
a model to be a representation of its target and hence to be used for learn-
ing about it (e.g., van Fraassen 1980; Giere 1988; Suppes 2002; Suarez
2003). Many have argued against this view, among other reasons because
actual scientiªc models are rarely isomorphic to their targets. Here I need
not be concerned with this aspect of the debate because in Read’s model
the theory model is in fact isomorphic to the data model. Nevertheless I
question the presupposition that isomorphism between the theory model
and the data model is sufªcient to yield explanation. Isomorphism is a sym-
metric relation, but explanation is not:1 the (theory) model explains (facts
about) its target (the data model), but the target (data model) does not ex-
plain the (theory) model. So, there must be features of the theory model,
absent from the data model, which make the former explanatory.2
2.
The question I am interested in is how the theory model contributes to
the explanation of facts about the target. The comparison with a model of
a social network brings out some elements that I think are downplayed in
Read’s account. Sociologists Bearman, Moody, and Stovel (2004; hence-
forth, BMS) obtain the structure of a sexual and romantic network among
adolescents in an American high school from the Add Health database.
The observed network is characterized by a very large component where
short cycles are virtually absent. Thus, the network displays the structure
of a spanning tree. BMS hypothesize different behavioral rules that could
generate the observed network: random mixing, homophily in partnership
selection, and a social norm against dating the old partner of the current
partner of one’s former partner. For each rule, or combination of them,
they build a simulation and check whether it generates the observed net-
work. The model that derives an outcome (a theory model, in Read’s ter-
minology) that matches the structure of the network (in Read’s terminol-
ogy, a data model) is the one that explains it. The conclusion is that the
structure of the observed network is possibly the result of homophily pref-
erences together with the social norm about partnerships. This is my re-
construction of BMS’ modeling strategy:
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1. Frigg (2006) makes this point about isomorphism and representation.
2. I am not referring to the degree of evidential support for the model.
[BMS1] From data about dating relationships (a model of ) the net-
work’s structure is construed
[BMS2] Alternative hypotheses concerning behavioral rules are
translated into computational models.
[BMS3] The computational model the outcome of which matches
the data model (possibly) explains the network’s structure.
As in Read’s model of kinship terminologies, the BMS target can also be
said to be represented in a data model. Also, in both successful replication
of the structure displayed by the data model is necessary for explanation.3
Hence the ªrst and third steps in BMS are analogous to those I identify in
Read’s. The two approaches however differ in two respects. First, BMS is a
simulation-based model whereas Read’s is an analytical model. This differ-
ence however is not relevant to my purpose here and I will not discuss it
further. More relevant are the differences in steps [R2] and [BMS2]: a the-
ory is explicitly included in Read’s but is absent in BMS and alternative
simulations representing different mechanisms are explored in BMS but
there is no analogous step in Read’s. Should we conclude that the two
modeling strategies represent different ways of construing explanations?
In the following section I hope to show that the differences are less sig-
niªcant than they ªrst appear.
3.
Step [BMS2] consists in hypothesizing different mechanisms to see which
network structures result from them. This step is crucial to the explana-
tory endeavor: it serves to address what-if-things-had-been-different questions
(Woodward 2003). That is, it is a matter of manipulating the model with
the purpose of investigating what happens under different assumptions
(e.g., if students are assumed to select their partners at random, a random
network structure obtains that fails to display the characteristics of the
data model). Manipulation here is not to be interpreted as material manip-
ulation, as when in a laboratory experiment a condition is changed to learn
how this change affects the outcome. The manipulations are theoretical in-
stead (Mäki 2005): they consist in modifying a model’s assumptions or in
comparing similar models that differ for a few relevant assumptions. Such
procedures enable one to draw inferences about alternative counterfactual
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3. This need not always be the case. For instance, in economics a model is often re-
garded as explanatory when it obtains a “stylized fact”, which is understood as a broad, of-
ten qualitative, generalization.
scenarios, identify what makes a difference for the explanandum and
thereby postulate relationships of either causal or constitutive dependence
(Woodward 2003; Craver 2007; Ylikoski 2007). Constitutive dependen-
cies are not causal: they relate the properties of the whole system to the
properties of the entities that constitute it (and their organization). In
both cases, however, explanation is a matter of revealing relationships of
counterfactual dependencies between the explanans and the explanandum.
In Read’s case properties of the kinship terminology are explained by
the generating rules for that kinship terminology. Hence, we can interpret
Read’s theory model as providing information about relationships of con-
stitutive dependence. The latter bear the explanatory burden. However,
Read does not talk of theoretical manipulation but identiªes an explicit
role for the theory—though it is not quite clear what theory means in this
context. Following Geertz, Read says that “the culture theory must be a
model for behavior by the culture-bearers, not a model of behavior by the
observer” (p. 7). The theory “for behavior” is intended to capture the way
in which culture-bearers actually compute kinship terminologies. The
theory of kinship terminologies, which takes kinship terms and hence kin-
ship terminologies to be generated through kin term products (and not
through genealogical relationships) guides, but does not fully determine,
the process of building models for particular kinship terminologies
(pp. 13–14).
Thus, prima facie, model-based explanation appears to proceed differ-
ently in the two cases. Whereas in BMS it works through the manipula-
tion and study of the theory models, in Read’s the explanatory capacity of
the theory model derives from its relationship to the theory. It is the the-
ory for kinship terminology structures, implemented in the theory model,
which contains the relevant information about explanatory relationships.
The activity of modeling itself does not seem to play any independent epi-
stemic or explanatory role. This runs counter to the current philosophical
(quasi)consensus that models have an epistemic role that is independent
both from theory and data (Morgan and Morrison 1999). Clearly the de-
gree to which a model is independent from theory varies and Read’s could
simply be a case where the model is in fact dependent on theory.
Yet I do not think that in Read’s case modeling itself plays no inde-
pendent epistemic role. To see why, consider the two puzzles about
kinship terminologies that Read claims are resolved by his modeling ap-
proach: the anomaly represented by the in-law sufªx in the American-
English terminology and the difference between classiªcatory and descrip-
tive terminologies.
The explanation of the anomaly of the in-law sufªx shows that the lat-
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ter is not in fact an anomaly “because logically spouse o aunt (uncle)  uncle
(aunt) . . . What -in-law marks . . . are the terms making up a third dimen-
sion introduced by the spouse term. The spouse product does not map aunt
and uncle into this third dimension . . . and so the -in-law sufªx does not
apply” (p. 19). Because the rule was built into the theory model from the
data model (step [R2] above), this explanation sounds circular. The im-
pression of circularity however disappears if one sees the explanation
as follows. Explanatory information is obtained by studying how the
structure in the theory model would be different, if a different rule of
term generation for spouse relations were different. Hence, manipulat-
ing the theory model gives information about the (constitutive) depend-
ence between the speciªc rules of generation of kin terms of the American-
English terminology the theory postulates and the terminology’s overall
structure.
That studying and manipulating the theory model is a crucial step in
the construction of explanations is illustrated even more clearly in the ex-
planation of the difference between descriptive and classiªcatory terminol-
ogies. The comparison between the theory model of each terminology re-
veals how their structure is different depending on whether the concept of
sibling is a generating concept or a derivative one. Similarly to the BMS
case, the comparison between models that represent different processes of
generation uncovers the relationship of dependence between features of
the components (the speciªc rules of generation) and the overall outcome.
Information about these relationships is then deployed for purposes of ex-
planation.
4.
I conclude with three brief observations. First, vis-à-vis Read’s own ac-
count, the view I propose more explicitly recognizes the role the activity of
modeling plays in the process of construing explanations. Second, and as a
consequence, it highlights the active role of the modelers, who build the mod-
els, perform operations on them, and use them to draw explanatory infer-
ences on the target. In other words, explanation is what modelers do by
manipulating the model and studying the consequences of those manipu-
lations. Finally, Read’s modeling approach is clearly distinctive because
of its subject matter: since the culture theory is a model for behavior,
the data model for behavior is structurally isomorphic to the theory
model, which is itself derived from the culture theory (p. 7). Nonetheless
I suggest that the process by which explanations are construed shares
important similarities with other modeling approaches in the social
sciences.
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